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François Gemenne
The concept of ‘environmental refugees’, or ‘climate refugees’, has been progressively 
abandoned, as having no legal basis. I want to argue that there are good reasons to use the 
term.
The difficulty of isolating environmental 
factors from other drivers of migration1 still 
exists but no-one now seems to deny their 
importance as a driving force of displacement. 
The concept of ‘environmental migration’ 
is now a common feature in migration 
studies, and the number of research projects, 
workshops and conferences on this topic 
has vastly expanded in recent years. 
Some geologists advocate the use of the term 
‘Anthropocene’ to signal a new geological era, 
the Age of Humans, where we have become 
the major force of transformation of the Earth. 
This is a formidable political statement. And 
it is also a statement for the social sciences: 
that the world – the social and political 
organisation of the Earth – can no longer be 
thought of separately from the Earth. Both the 
world and the Earth need to be conceived of 
as one global system; geopolitics is no longer 
about power over territories, about land and 
sea, but about the Earth as a whole. Geopolitics 
is transformed into the politics of the Earth. 
But there’s another way to see this. We also 
need to be aware of the de-politicisation of 
subjects that this can imply. Even if humans 
have indeed replaced natural drivers of 
changes as the principal agents of changes 
on this planet, most humans are actually the 
victims of these changes, and not their agents. 
Migration as a commodity
As the concept of ‘environmental migration’ 
gained currency, migration was less perceived 
as a decision of last resort that people take 
when they have exhausted all possible 
options for adaptation in their place of 
origin. Many scholars, including myself, had 
insisted that this depiction of migrants did 
not match reality, and that migration was 
often a resource used by migrants to deal 
with environmental changes. We insisted 
that migrants should not be perceived as 
resourceless victims, paying the price of 
climate change, but rather as resourceful 
agents of their own adaptation. We argued 
that migration could indeed prove to be 
a powerful adaptation strategy whereby 
migrants could diversify their incomes, 
alleviate environmental pressures in the 
region of origin, send remittances, or simply 
put themselves and their families out of 
harm’s way. And this view was soon embraced 
by many institutions and organisations. It 
even made its way into the international 
negotiations on climate change. In 2010, 
the Cancun Adaptation Framework spoke 
of “measures to enhance understanding, 
coordination and cooperation with regard 
to climate change induced displacement, 
migration and planned relocation (…)”.2
That was a paradigm shift: that migration in 
the context of climate change was no longer 
a disaster to avoid at all costs but a strategy 
that ought to be encouraged and facilitated. 
The movement of people was no longer 
a matter of migration policy but rather of 
environmental policy – an adaptation strategy. 
What about those who were forced to flee 
as a result of environmental disruptions, 
those who would have liked to stay but 
had no other choice? These displacements 
were now considered as a sort of a 
collateral damage that could be addressed 
through the Loss and Damage mechanism 
designed in the climate negotiations.
Migration related to climate change had 
become something that we could enable, 
facilitate and manage. And this is something 
that we, as a research community, had 
pushed forward and wished for.






Why we let migrants down
Upon further thought, however, I am forced 
to realise that there is something that we had 
missed out in this process of ‘de-victimisation’ 
of migrants. We had used environmental 
change to de-politicise migration and, in 
our quest to make research policy-relevant, 
we had let policies take over politics. In 
our attempt to stress the agency of the 
migrants, we had forgotten the responsibility 
that we had towards them, because we 
humans have become the main agents of 
transformation of the Earth. And the result 
of this transformation has been to make their 
places on the Earth increasingly uninhabitable 
for a growing number of people. 
A fundamental difficulty in the collective 
action against climate change is that those 
who need to undertake most of the effort 
to cut greenhouse gas emissions – the 
industrialised countries – are also those that 
will be comparatively less affected by the 
impacts of global warming. Industrialised 
nations have thus little incentive to act; our 
agency is undone by our self-interest. 
Climate change, indeed, is rooted in the 
inequalities between rich and poor; and 
migration is the mode through which these 
inequalities materialise. Early theories on 
migration assumed that migration could 
be an adjustment between inequalities, yet 
it is the symptom rather than the cure.
De-politicising migration
In the press and in public debates, those 
uprooted by climate change were once 
often called ‘climate refugees’. Legal 
scholars and international organisations, 
however, have been very keen to dismiss 
the term as having no legal basis. Most 
scholars – logically – agreed not to use the 
term and to use more clinical terms such 
as ‘climate-induced migrants’, ‘mobility in 
the context of climate change’, etc. I was 
one of them, and I think I was wrong. 
By forgoing the term ‘climate refugee’ we 
had also de-politicised the reality of these 
migrations. A central element in the concept 
of ‘refugee’ is persecution: in order to 
qualify as a refugee, you need to be fleeing 
persecution, or to fear persecution. Forgoing 
the term ‘climate refugee’ is also, in a way, 
forgoing the idea that climate change is a form 
of persecution against the most vulnerable 
and that climate-induced migration is a very 
political matter, rather than an environmental 
one.3 For this reason, and contrary to what I 
might have thought (and written) in the past, 
and despite the legal difficulties, I think this 
is a very strong reason to use the term again: 
because it recognises that these migrations are 
first and foremost the result of a persecution 
that we are inflicting on the most vulnerable.
In April 2013 in Bangladesh the Rana Plaza 
garment factory collapsed with the death of 
more than 1,000 workers. At that time, I was 
struck by the international reaction to the 
disaster: not only was there a wide-ranging 
outcry at the working conditions in these 
factories but many people held the clothing 
companies responsible for the disaster. 
Some stopped buying clothes from high-
street retail chains and called for a boycott, 
or demanded better working conditions 
for the garment workers in Bangladesh. It 
was as if people had suddenly realised that 
their buying clothes had consequences for 
people on the other side of the planet.
But Bangladesh is also a country at the 
forefront of climate impacts, where 
displacements are already a common feature. 
Yet the connection between the action of some 
and the suffering of others, which was made 
on the occasion of the Rana Plaza tragedy, 
does not seem to be made for climate change. 
And this is why there is at least one very 
good reason to speak of ‘climate refugees’.
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